Introduction and overview
Understanding the association between financial and trade openness remains among the contested issues in International Economics. Earlier contributions pointed out the wisdom of sequencing reforms -liberalizing international trade prior to the financial opening (see Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1986) . In the 1990s, a large number of developing countries, independently of their trade openness, embraced rapid financial opening, relegating the sequencing debate to academic textbooks. Yet, the financial crises impacting markets in the second part of the 1990s renewed the debate about the wisdom of financial opening, and about sequencing.
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Most of the debate focused on the adjustment to changes in the regulations governing financial flows, steps that are associated with modifying the de-jure financial openness. Yet, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003) showed that considerable insight is gained from studying the de-facto financial openness, quite independently of the de-jure openness. This de-facto financial openness measure is analogous to trade openness, focusing on the actual sum of (absolute) flows relative to the GDP. Hence, while the de-jure openness focuses on regulators' intent, the de-jure is an outcome-based measure. This paper follows methodology, investigating the linkages between the de-facto trade and financial openness.
We conjecture that greater de-facto trade integration provides the impetus for greater de-facto financial opening. We identify a public finance channel that explains the association between trade and financial openness, and show that the long run trends in the last three decades have been consistent with our conjecture. Hence, we conclude that there is a de-facto sequencing, where greater trade integration leads to greater de-facto trade integration.
Some insight into the possible linkages between financial and trade opening is obtained by looking at the patterns of changes in openness in the last thirty years. Figure 1 traces the association between changes in trade openness and financial openness [plotted horizontally and 1 A useful survey of financial liberalization is Williamson and Mahar (1998) . See Diaz-Alejandro, (1985) , Rodrik (1999) and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) for skeptical assessments of the gains from financial liberalization. See Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) for a cost/benefit study of financial opening. For studies dealing with the financial instability associated with capital account opening see the papers in Edwards and Frankel (2002) and Feldstein (2003) , and Aizenman (2004) for an overview of the challenges associated with financial opening. all developing countries (subject to data availability). To control for the possibility that the results are driven by extreme points, regression 2 excludes from the sample developing economies countries that are characterized by financial openness that exceeds 100%, or by trade openness that exceeds 60%, and small island economies. 4 Finally, regression 3 deals only with the OECD countries. 5 The first two regressions indicate a highly significant positive association between changes in financial and trade openness in developing countries. A ten percent increase in trade openness is associated with, on average, a 2.6% increase in financial openness for all the developing countries, and with a 0.7% increase in financial openness in the trimmed sample of developing countries. The size of this effect in the OECD countries is 2%, but at a substantially lower significance level. The impact of changes in GDP per capita on financial openness are relatively large and highly significant for the sample of all developing 2 Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002) , and Prasad, Rogoff, . Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, using the WDI data.
3 The inclusion of the GDP per capita as an explanatory variable is suggested by the linkages between the GDP per capital level and financial depth.
3 countries, and for the OECD countries, but weakly significant in the trimmed developing countries sample.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Needless to say, these regressions are only suggestive, and do not provide information on the economic forces inducing the existence of linkages between the two openness measures.
This paper outlines one possible linkage between the two, operating via public finance channels. Specifically, I argue that the pragmatic case for financial reforms in the presence of growing trade integration follows from the endogenous linkages between financial and trade openness.
I show that the relatively costly collection of taxes implies that financial repression would be part of the menu of taxes. The impact of financial repression is to allow the government to recycle its domestic debt at a lower real interest rate than one that would have prevailed with full financial integration, and to tax the option of saving in foreign assets.
Hence, one should view the drop in the interest rate facing domestic savers as an implicit tax on domestic savings. 6 This tax provides the impetus for capital flight, in search of a higher return on savings. A frequent mechanism facilitating capital flight is over invoicing of imports and under invoicing of exports. 7 The scale of these activities is proportional to the trade openness of the economy. This in turn implies that greater trade openness increases the effective financial openness, by providing more opportunities for capital flight.
This linkage, however, is subject to the costly control of the fiscal authorities.
Curtailing illicit capital flows requires spending resources on monitoring and enforcement of existing capital controls. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of capital controls 6 See Giovannini and de Melo (1993) for documenting and measuring financial repression as an implicit tax on savings, and Kletzer and Kohli (2003) for analysis of the fiscal implications of financial repression in India. See Dooley (1996) for an overview of financial controls. 7 Further discussion of trade misinvoicing as a mechanism for illicit capita flight, see Claessens and Naudé (1993) , Ajayi (1997) , Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) , Eggerstedt et al. 1995; and Collier et al. (2001) . These studies concluded that trade misinvoicing is an important channel of capital flight. For example, Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) estimated that for twenty five Sub-Saharan countries, trade misinvoicing led to $40.6 billion of capital flight in the years 1970-1996. would increase with the resources spent on monitoring and enforcement per additional dollar of international trade.
I characterize the pattern of taxes that would maximize consumer's utility, subject to the need to finance a given fiscal outlay (this process is equivalent to minimizing the deadweight loss associated with a given fiscal expenditure). I show that more costly collection of taxes and lower trade openness increase the level of financial repression adopted by the policy maker. A key result of this framework is that greater trade openness reduces the This paper is related to several independent strands in the literature, including endogenous enforcement and institutions (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 1998) , the sequencing of reforms literature (see Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1986) , and the association between sovereign lending and international trade (see Rose and Spiegel, 2002) . Its main conclusion is that optimal financial and trade openness are intertwined, and that the pressure to open the financial system is a by-product of successful trade integration.
Section 2 outlines the model, and presents the main results. Section 3 concludes with a discussion. The Appendix derives the main results.
The model
The following section outlines a model describing realistic conditions under which greater trade openness leads to financial openness. I consider a developing country where fiscal outlays are financed by means of two taxes: a direct income tax, and an implicit tax induced by capital controls. Both taxes are costly: the income tax is associated with deadweight losses due to collection and enforcement costs. Similarly, enforcing capital controls entails costly prevention of illicit capital flight.
I illustrate the design of optimal policies by considering a small, two goods, two periods economy. The utility of the representative consumer is given by
where X is the domestic good , and Y is the foreign, imported good. To simplify, I normalize the prices of both goods to one, and denote consumption by
Consumers are endowed each period with X units of the domestic good. The authorities tax the income form the endowment X at a rate t. The consumer saves in period one D , allocating it between domestic and foreign bonds, D and D*, respectively:
where
, and ) 1 (
is the income from the old bonds that are repaid in period one.
The international real interest rate is * r . The authorities impose capital control in the form of a tax on the foreign bond. Let φ denote the tax rate, implying that the domestic interest rate, r, is determined by
Consequently, the tax determines the premium between the foreign and domestic real interests The premium φ is also a measure of the intensity of financial controls. The existence of the premium implies that consumers would have the incentive to engage in illicit capital flight, in order to avoid the tax. This capital flight is intermediated via the trade account, hence its potential magnitude would be determined by the volume of imports ( 1 Y ) and exports (
Preventing illicit capital flows induced by a premium φ requires spending X τ on enforcement.
I assume that enforcement and the resultant premium are linked by the following reduced form:
This formulation assumes that larger trade openness requires an equi-proportionate increase in enforcement in order to support the given premium. It also recognizes the diminishing marginal efficacy of enforcement. The tax on foreign bonds and the enforcement of financial repression implies that the consumer is indifferent between the domestic and the foreign bond. Hence, the second period budget constraint is
I consolidate the periodic budget constraints (2) and (5) into the intertemporal one:
Enforcement of the income tax is associated with collection cost λ per one dollar of gross taxes, implying that the net tax collected by a tax t is
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The potential capital flight is assumed to be proportional to imports. Similar results would hold if one assumed that potential capital flight to be proportional to (imports+exports).
The net revenue from the income tax, plus the revenue from the domestic bond sold in period one finances the fiscal expenditure on public spending (G), plus the cost of the enforcement of capital controls, plus the repayment of old debt:
Similarly, the second period fiscal budget constraint is
Applying (3), (8), (9) I consolidate the two budget constraints into the intertemporal one:
Financial repression imposes taxes on domestic savings at the premium rate, φ. This tax has two components: first, it taxes foreign bonds, * D directly, at the premium rate. In addition, it reduces the cost of financing the domestic debt, D , at the premium rate. 
The intertemporal consumption pattern is characterized by the conventional FOC:
The policy maker chooses the tax rates t, and the enforcement τ that would maximize the utility of the representative agent, subject to the fiscal and the private budget constraints, (6), (10), and the first order conditions (11) and (12). This process is facilitated by consolidating the private and the public budget constraints, (4) and (10) To simplify notation, I use the normalization 1 = X . Applying consumption's first order condition (12) it follows:
Applying (14) I infer that a marginal perturbation of (dt, dτ), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (13), impacts consumer's welfare by
where, from (10)
Note that determining the optimal enforcement of capital controls also establishes the optimum level of financial repression, as summarized by the premium φ. A useful benchmark is full financial integration, τ = 0, thereby 0 ; * 1
. Applying this to (15) I find
Equation ( , the optimal financial repression is determined by:
The following characterizes the pattern of optimal taxes and resulting financial repression (see Appendix A for derivation):
Claim 1:
-Full financial integration is optimal in the presence of lump sum taxes (i.e., where λ = 0).
-Costly collection of taxes and low enough trade openness implies that financial repression would be part of the menu of taxes.
-Higher savings and more costly collection of taxes increase the optimal level of financial
, where φ stands for the optimal financial repression premium].
-Greater trade openness (defined by the consumption share of imports, β), tends to reduce the optimal level of financial repression,
. This follows from the observation that greater trade openness increases the effective cost of financial repression, reducing thereby the usefulness of financial repression as an implicit tax.
Further insight is gained by considering a simulation of the case where aggregate saving is inelastic with respect to the interest rate. Figure 3 reports the association of financial repression tax, φ , drawn against the trade openness, β. The higher curve corresponds to a higher cost of tax collection.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Discussion I simplified the analysis by assuming the same income tax (t) in both periods.
Allowing for intertemporal variation of the income tax would imply that the taxes are set to equate the marginal tax distortion across both time periods (as in Barro, 1979) The main modification induced by this change would be that higher outstanding public debt, or higher fiscal expenditure, would increase the optimal level of financial repression.
Our openness measure is utility based, being related to the consumption weight of the foreign good. One may argue that the openness of the economy is impacted both by the supply and demand side. Yet, the logic of our discussion is unrelated to the exact determinants of openness, as it follows from the enforcement technology, defined by (4). To illustrate this point, Appendix B focuses on the dual case, where there is only one traded good, the production function is a Cobb-Douglas in the domestic and the foreign input, and trade is determined by the demand for imported inputs. It is shown there that an exact version of the above claim continues to hold. Note, however, that we do not model explicitly liberalization of trade policy -such an extension would require a more elaborate discussion, modifying the government budget constraint and the determination of endogenous openness. Hence, we ignored the possibility that tariffs could be used for fiscal purposes, as had been the case in most developing countries in the mid part of the Twentieth Century. A reason for this omission is that in recent years, tariff rates declined dramatically. One can add tariffs to the model, without impacting the logic of Claim 1.
Our analysis isolated the impact of greater trade openness on financial openness.
Hence, we overlooked the possibility of reverse feedbacks, where greater financial openness impact trade openness. We also ignore the interplay of de-jure reforms on the de-facto measures of openness, where political economy considerations affect that speed and the abruptness of reforms. In some countries, trade reform may be on-going process, whereas financial deregulation may be quicker. Political economy considerations also suggests that when trade openness reaches a critical threshold, financial repression is no longer sustainable; occasionally leading to a quick financial reform, sometimes leading to a too abrupt financial opening. The important issues are left for future research.
Concluding remarks
The arguments advanced in this paper imply that trade opening will inevitably lead to financial opening, increasing thereby the cost of public debt. Hence, sustainability of the resultant financial opening requires a deep fiscal restructuring. Argentina stands as a sad example of this logic. There, the impact of adopting financial opening without a deep enough fiscal restructuring was a massive increase in the cost of refinancing the public debt. In general, while it may take some time for the debt build up to induce a crisis, at the end of the process financial repression and inflation remain the default taxes used by weak fiscal systems.
The public finance linkage between trade and financial openness is only one of the possible channels explaining the association between the two. A unique characteristic of financial repression is in its being a hidden link. Other, more transparent channels include trade credits, which imply a direct association between trade and financial openness.
Understanding all the hidden linkages between trade and financial opening requires studying other important issues. I close the paper with a review of these issues:
-The exact sequencing of the linkages between trade and financial opening, including the possibility of periodic reversals due to financial crises.
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-It would be useful to conduct a more detailed empirical investigation of the importance of trade misinvoicing in accounting for endogenous financial opening: conventional de-facto measures of de facto financial openness do not capture well the flows associated with trade misinvocing.
-The possibility of reverse linkages between financial opening and trade opening. Further investigation of the issues described above is left for future research.
11 On the association between financial opening and financial crises see Williamson and Mahar (1998) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) .
Appendix A
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive the results summarized in Claim 1. Suppose that there are no lump sum taxes (λ > 0), and the public debt is positive, leading to an internal equilibrium where financial repression is part of the tax menu. The first order condition characterizing the financial repression is [see (15) and (16)]:
Note that (A1) implies that
. This condition has a simple interpretation. The graph (
) is the financial tax Laffer curve, plotting the association between the enforcement cost τ and the net revenue from the financial repression. The optimal level of public financing requires being on the left side of the tax Laffer curve, where one dollar spent on enforcing capital controls yields more than one dollar of tax revenue.
Denoting the LHS of (A1) by L, applying the implicit function theorem, and the second order condition for maximization, it follows that:
Note that 
Applying (A1) to (A3), collecting terms, I infer that
The term
− is the elasticity of the net tax collection from financial repression with respect to the enforcement cost. This elasticity would be less then one as long as the Laffer curve is convex with respect to τ, implying that in these circumstances
Finally, I turn to the derivation of I denote the semi-elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the premium by η , where
Note that changing the premium reduces the consumer's interest rate. Applying (3) I infer that
Hence, the semi-elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the premium corresponds to the elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the real interest rate, η . The presumption is that this elasticity is rather small. Applying (A1'), I infer that, after several iterations of substitutions 
Appendix B
The purpose of this Appendix is to illustrate that Claim 1 holds also for the case where openness is solely determined by the supply side of the economy. Specifically, suppose that the utility is
where Z is a final consumption good, the production of which is given by:
where X and Y are the domestic and foreign input, respectively. The endowment of the domestic input is X . Both inputs are traded, and their price is normalized to 1. It is easy to verify that in this case, the price of good Z is one, and that
Furthermore, the various budget constraint equations (2)- (10) and ( A "****, "**" , "*" indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002) , and Prasad, Rogoff, .
Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, using the WDI data. The units of observations are non-overlapping five year changes in the openness measures, throughout 1969-1998. 
